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A major priority for any company contemplating foreign investment is the
establishment of contacts, be they direct or indirect, with the relevant foreign
authorities. Without the necessary information and approvals most ventures
would be doomed from the outset. In this context companies are all too
frequently confronted with the question whether and/or to what extent foreign
authorities are bound by promises or statements made to an investor. This
uncertainty can be of enormous significance when, for example, a company is
promised a building subsidy, a tax concession, or a permit to purchase real
estate.1
A possible scenario would be as follows: The firm INVEST intends to buy a
piece of land in order to set up a luxury retirement village with extensive leisure
facilities. INVEST applies to the relevant local authority for the necessary
permits for the area, which lies partly in a residential area and partly in a nature
reserve. Upon being asked by INVEST's agent whether a permit for the intended
purchase would be granted, the officer responsible replies that there would be
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1. See, e.g., Hampshire Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 874 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987),
where the United States Customs Service had promised to value particular imported goods on the
basis of the "export value" instead of on the basis of the "American selling price."
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"no problems" in this regard. The firm wishes to finance the purchase by selling
several blocks in another district, but the intended swap fails. After negotiations
the officer responsible signs a permit allowing INVEST to sell the blocks in
question. Despite the previous oral assurance, the responsible authorities
subsequently issue a written refusal of the purchase application, thereby
frustrating INVEST's aims.2
I. Federal Republic of Germany
In German law the question of whether the authorities are bound by such
assurances depends on the legal form in which the assurances were made. If, for
example, the assurance is made as a preliminary decision in the form of an
administrative act benefitting the applicant, then the possibility of a withdrawal
or revocation is determined by sections 48 and 49 of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz or VwVfG) 3 as well as the corre-
sponding state regulations. First, it is necessary to determine whether or not the
administrative act was in conformity with the law. In the case of a beneficial and
legitimate administrative act the principle of irrevocability applies, although an
absolute bar to revocation is not created. The authorities may only revoke a
beneficial and legitimate prospective administrative act under the narrow
conditions of section 49 paragraph 2 of the VwVfG. In such a case they are
obliged to compensate the affected person for the damages incurred by his
reliance on the continued effect of the administrative act, to the extent that his
reliance is worthy of protection (section 49 paragraph 5 of the VwVfG).
If the beneficial administrative act is of an illegal nature the principle of
protection of reliance applies. In the case of material or monetary activities or
transactions arising from an illegal administrative act, this principle means that
the administrative act may not be revoked insofar as the beneficiary has relied on
the administrative act continuing to be effective and his reliance is worthy of
protection when balanced against the public interest in revocation (section 48
paragraph 2 subparagraph 1 of the VwVfG). In the case of benefits that are
neither monetary nor material in nature arising from an illegal administrative act,
the appropriate remedy is financial compensation. In these circumstances the
administrative act may be freely revoked as long as compensation is paid for
damages arising from reliance (section 48 paragraph 3 subparagraph I of the
VwVfG).
During the investment process the question of administrative acts (or their
absence) frequently does not arise until late in the proceedings. Nonetheless, the
2. These facts are based on a decision of the German Federal Administrative Court, I
Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwGE] 254 (1955).
3. The Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVfG] is a codification of the rules of procedure in
administrative actions. Although there exist both federal and state Administrative Procedure Acts,
most of their regulations are identical, since all Acts are based on a uniform draft.
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person involved has an obvious and immediate interest in gaining a binding
promise from the authorities concerning their future actions. Such an interest is
particularly understandable when the authorities have discretionary powers with
regard to the contemplated administrative action. Even in cases where the
authorities have no discretion, however, it may be advantageous to obtain a
binding statement, particularly if the state of the law is unclear or disputed.
For just such circumstances case law and doctrinal writers4 have developed the
institution of the "administrative promise" or offentlich-rechtliche Zusage.5 The
West German legislature has defined one aspect of the "administrative promise,"
the so-called "assurance" or Zusicherung, in section 38 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Zusicherung is a promise given by the responsible authority
to carry out or refrain from carrying out a particular administrative act at some
future point in time. It is, however, only effective when given in writing, and is
thus not applicable to the circumstances under investigation here.
Apart from the Zusicherung under section 38 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, there exists the "general" administrative promise or allgemeine offentlich-
rechtliche Zusage. This becomes significant whenever an authority promises to
make a decision, to carry out some kind of administrative act, to conclude a
public contract, or to act in a private legal capacity such as in the sale or purchase
of real estate. 6 The prerequisites for the effectiveness of the assurance (Zu-
sicherung) are not applicable to the promise (Zusage).7
An effective Zusicherung presupposes that the administration enters into an
official obligation towards the promises and wishes to be bound by the
obligation. 8 This is the crucial difference between entering into a promise and
merely providing information. In the latter case the authorities have no desire to
bind themselves, but are rather simply providing information concerning factual
or legal circumstances. The authorities can only be legally bound with regard to
the promissee if they have unambiguously expressed their willingness to do so.
It is not sufficient for the authorities to state, for example, that a permit would
be issued shortly.9 It is also necessary that the matter concerning which the
promise is made lies within the power of the administration and that the promise
is made by an officer who, by virtue of his position within the administration is
authorized to make such declarations. In addition, the promise must not
4. The work of doctrinal writers occupies a more fundamental and integral place in the
hierarchy of the Romano-Germanic legal system when compared with the Common Law system; see
R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 147-54 (3d ed. 1985).
5. See W. FIEDLER, FUNKTION UND BEDEUTUNG OFFENTLICH-RECHTLICHER ZUSAGEN IM VERWAL-
TUNGSRECHT (1977).
6. For an overview of these various circumstances, see K. OBERMAYER, KOMMENTAR ZUM
VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ § 38 Randnuer [RdNr.] 14 (Neuwied 1983).
7. This remains the dominant opinion in case law and commentaries; see P. STELKENS, H. BONK
& U. LEONHARDT, VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ 38 RdNr.2 (2d ed. 1983).
8. BVerwG, 1966 Zeitschrift fiur Beamtenrecht 377; 1976 Deutsches Verwaltungsbiatt 339.
9. 74 BVerwGE 15, 17 (1987).
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contravene any Rechtssatz or "legal rule."' 10 If a promise is illegal due to a
breach of a regulation then, according to the cases and the greater part of the
literature, the general principles for the revocation of illegal beneficial adminis-
trative acts are not applicable. Instead the promise is to be seen as nonbinding.
Only in narrowly defined and exceptional circumstances may the promise be
binding due to the need to protect the promissee's reliance."I
This short overview of West German law concerning oral promises made by
public authorities shows that considerable uncertainty exists. The criteria
expounded by the Federal Administrative Court are hardly suited to allowing an
unequivocal prognosis as to whether an authority's promise is binding or not.
II. The Common Law Jurisdictions
The divergent historical development of the law in England and on the
Continent shows that there exists in the Common Law jurisdictions, in contrast
to the Continental legal orders, no discrete legal category known as public law.' 2
The question as to whether an authority is bound by a promise or assurance has
been traditionally characterized as being one of private law.
A private individual will be held to a promise or to an assurance if the said
promise or assurance was made to another person with the intention that it be
binding and the other person has acted in reliance thereupon. 13 Such issues
primarily come under the rubric of estoppel. Three general forms of estoppel
may be distinguished: "by record," "by deed," and "by representation." In the
present case the last form, "by representation," applies. It may occur:
where one person (the representor) has made a representation to another person (the
representee) in words or by acts and conduct, or (being under a duty to the representee
to speak or act) by silence or inaction, with the intention (actual or presumptive), and
with the result, of inducing the representee on the faith of such representation to alter
his position to his detriment, the representor, in any litigation which may afterwards
take place between him and the representee, is estopped, as against the representee,
from making, or attempting to establish by evidence, any averment substantially at
10. Id. For a brief description of the significance of the 'legal rule" (Rechtssatz or r~gle de droit)
in the Romano-Germanic legal system, see R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 4, at 94, 335.
11. BVerwG, 1966 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 857. For an opposing view, see W. FIEDLER,
supra note 5, at 80.
12. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 4, at 81-85. Indeed it was for a long time denied
that there existed in England any such thing as "administrative law." This was primarily the result
of the theories of the prominent English jurist A.V. Dicey. Only in the last few decades of this century
has a relatively coherent body of administrative law developed in the common law jurisdictions,
primarily through the decisions of the higher courts. Australia would appear to have gone further in
this regard, as comprehensive federal legislation (known as the "new administrative law") has in
many areas replaced or augmented judge-made law. A particularly significant development was the
creation of the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which in many respects may be
compared to the West German Bundesverwaltungsgericht or the French Conseil d'8tat. See
S. HOTOP, PRINCIPLES OF AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW chs. I, X (6th ed. 1985).
13. Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1948] All E.R. 767, 770.
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variance with his former representation, if the representee at the proper time, and in the
proper manner, objects thereto. 14
This principal of private law, however, cannot simply be transplanted into the
public sphere. Originally the public administration was in general allocated a
privileged position:
Although the courts have developed a doctrine of equitable estoppel, under which one
who makes a representation to another who reasonably relies on it to his detriment is
estopped to deny the truth of the representation or to gain by taking a position
inconsistent with the representation, the court built up a large body of law that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to the government. 15
Many judgments illustrate these precepts by statements such as: "The King is
not bound by estoppels, though he can take advantage of them." 16 On the other
hand, a series of decisions also exist in which the doctrine of estoppel was
expressly applied against the public administration.
The starting point for determining the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel
against the Crown is the question of how the relevant statutory bases define rights
and obligations. One group of statutes determines directly how rights and
obligations arise without the administration being able to exert any influence on
them ("the statute speaks for itself"). Another group of norms grants the
administration the power to determine individually the rights and obligations
("the statute defines rights in terms of determination").
A. FIRST GROUP OF CASES: "THE STATUTE
SPEAKS FOR ITSELF"
In this first group there can be no application of the doctrine of estoppel, since
the legal relationships are independent of official acts:
No estoppel can arise out of the acts of an official who enjoys no authoritative power
of decision in relation to the rights and obligations in question. Why should this be so?
The answer is the supremacy of legislation. Ex hypothesi, legal relations arising from
legislation are independent of official action. Consequently, nothing can be made to
hinge on the conduct of officials without disturbing the legal consequences called for by
the statute. 7
This principle was applied in Millet v. The Queen. 18 In this case the husband
of the plaintiff concluded an insurance contract with the Crown under the
Veterans' Insurance Act. The relevant conditions of performance contained a
stipulation by which the policy would become invalid if the insurance payments
were made late. The husband made two late payments which were nonetheless
14. G.S. BOWER & A. TURNER, THE LAW RELATING TO ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION 4 (2d ed.
1966).
15. K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 343 (3d ed. 1972).
16. The King v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1920] 50 D.L.R. 293, 304 (Manitoba Ct. App.).
17. McDonald, Contradictory Government Action: Estoppel of Statutory Authorities, 17
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 160, 161 (1979).
18. [1954] Ex. C.R. 562 (Can.).
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accepted by the responsible officers. The last payment before his death was also
late. The Crown relied on this delay and declared the contract of insurance
invalid.
The Exchequer Court decided that the acceptance of the delayed payments by
the Crown did not prevent it from insisting on strict compliance with the
conditions of performance. The Crown could thus rely on these conditions in
declaring the policy invalid. The court reasoned that "where a particular
obligation or duty is imposed by statute or by regulations validly made
thereunder and embodied in a contract no estoppel should be allowed to give
relief from the said obligation." 19 The primary basis for the strict application of
the statutory regulations is that these norms would otherwise be treated as if they
had never entered into force. 2 0 This reasoning is reflected in a range of decisions:
[Estoppel] cannot, therefore, avail in such a case to release the plaintiff from an
obligation to obey such a statute, nor can it enable the defendant to escape from a
statutory obligation of such a kind on his part. It is immaterial whether the obligation
is onerous or otherwise to the party suing. The duty of each party is to obey the law.
2
'
B. SECOND GROUP OF CASES: "THE STATUTE
DEFINES RIGHTS IN TERMS OF DETERMINATION"
A different set of circumstances arises when the public administration exercises
a certain degree of competence in making decisions. McDonald characterizes this
group of cases in the following terms: "In such a case, [the government official]
is not in the same position as a private person. His decisions are not extraneous
to the statutory rights and obligations that are to be implemented."
22
When considering decisions of a discretionary nature the administration
cannot be bound to exercise its discretion one way or the other, nor can it be
bound to refrain from making any decision at all. If, however, the administration
does make a decision, it is then bound by it. These principles have found
recognition in many judgments in various common law jurisdictions.23 The
following cases are illustrative of the breadth of application of the principles.
In Jaillard v. City of Montreal24 the responsible head of the police station had
initially given his approval in principle to a construction application. He
19. Id. at 572 (Fournier, J.).
20. McDonald, supra note 17, at 162; see also The Mun. Council of the United Counties of
Peterborough & Victoria v. The Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 18 U.C.Q.B. 220, 224 (1859).
21. Maritime Elec. Co. v. General Dairies, Ltd., [1937] A.C. 610, 620 (P.C. 1935) (Can.) (Lord
Maugham). In this case the plaintiff, an energy utility in Fredericton, New Brunswick, had
mistakenly undercharged the defendant. The Privy Council overturned the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada and determined that there was no estoppel, as § 16 of the Public Utilities Act of New
Brunswick provided that all "public utility companies" were to charge the set rates, no more and no
less.
22. McDonald, supra note 17, at 162.
23. For a detailed discussion, see McDonald, supra note 17, at 167.
24. [1934] 72 C.S. 112 (Quebec Superior Court).
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subsequently refused the application, however, due to the opposition of a parish
priest. The Cour Sup~rieure de Montrdal ordered the city to grant the approval
sought on the grounds that the administration was obliged to decide according to
its own discretion, not that of others. The court reasoned as follows:
[I]f the authority to exercise that discretion is delegated to an officer of the city,.
that discretion should be exercised by that officer and not by another .... The refusal
of the officer to grant the permit was not the exercise of his judgment or his discretion,
but the discretion or judgment of another, who had no authority whatever to interfere
in or control the matter.25
In R. v. Dominion of Canada Postage Stamp Vending Co.26 the Postmaster
General had, in the exercise of his authority, distributed licenses for the sale
of postage stamps. These licenses were in the form of contracts which, inter
alia, foresaw that such licenses would be irrevocable. The Supreme Court of
Canada held the irrevocability clause to be inadmissible for the following
reasons:
A Minister cannot, by agreement, deprive himself of a power which is committed to
him to be exercised from time to time as occasion may require in the public interest, or
validly covenant to refrain from the use of that power when it may be requisite, or
expedient in his discretion, upon grounds of public policy, to execute it.. 27
Although this principle is basically unquestioned, there have been some cases in
which the administration had limited its own room for maneuvering and was
subsequently bound thereby.28
In one case, Re Multi-Malls Inc. & Minister of Transportation,29 a local
council had submitted to the Minister for approval a draft plan, in accordance
with the relevant regulations. Section 15(1) of the Planning Act allowed for the
Minister to refer the draft plan as a whole or in part back to the local council and
that he should do this upon request of a person affected. After receiving the draft
plan, the Minister gave an assurance that he would refer a certain part of the draft
plan, for which alterations had been requested, back to the local council. In spite
of this promise, the Minister approved the plan as a whole, without having
referred back the part in question for reconsideration.
The Ontario Court of Appeal cited the judgment of the English Court of
Appeal in the Liverpool case 30 and decided that the approval by the Minister was
without effect:
In my view, on this basis, it was implicit in the assurances given by the Ministry that
the plan would not be approved without the requested modifications unless there was a
reference to the Board. The appellants relied on the assurances [given by the Ministry]
25. Id. at 114 (Greenshields, C.J.).
26. [1930] 4 D.L.R.241 (Can.).
27. Id. at 244 (Lamont, J.).
28. For a detailed discussion, see McDonald, supra note 17, at 175.
29. [1977] 73 D.L.R.(3d) 18 (Ontario C.A.).
30. Re, Liverpool Taxi Owners' Association, [1972] 2 All E.R. 589 (C.A.).
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to their detriment, as they themselves could and would have requested the Minister to
refer the matter. The Liverpool decision . . imposed on the Minister, in accordance
with natural justice if not by estoppel, the duty not to give approval to the unmodified
official plan without referring the matter to the Municipal Board for a public hearing,
in accordance with his statutory duty and the assurances given.3
The Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion in H.TV. Ltd. v. Price
Comm'n, 32 in which Lord Denning held the Commission to be bound by its prior
systematic and uniform interpretation of statutory regulations.
This principle was further developed by way of the decision of the Ontario
High Court in Re Smith & Municipality of Vanier. 33 In this case the applicant had
made an application for a license to run a public hall. His application was
rejected. The initial decision was justified by the Municipal Council on the basis
of unsatisfactory safety precautions and the lack of evidence of adequate
insurance. The applicant eliminated these defects and informed the municipality
accordingly. The municipality then passed a resolution not to approve the public
hall "in the public interest." Without expressly relying on the doctrine of
estoppel the municipality was directed to reconsider the application:
Would not a reasonable man be entitled to assume from the posture of the Municipal
Council on return of the first motion that approval would be forthcoming if he remedied
the deficiencies? In the present case the applicant ordered his affairs accordingly. Then,
after completing the deficiencies with the financial consequences which that entailed he
finds that the Council refused to issue the license. Under such circumstances I believe
a Court is entitled to look beyond the resolution to refuse the license. I am of opinion
that there was a want of good faith in law and accordingly an order of mandamus may
issue. 34
McDonald summarizes the principles inherent in this group of cases thus:
A public authority cannot be estopped from exercising its powers. But once the
authority has decided that a particular exercise of power is appropriate, it must act
accordingly, at least where there has been reliance on that decision. . . . But the
principle is taken one step further in cases such as Re Smith and Municipality of Vanier.
When the authority by its conduct leads the individual to believe that a decision has
been made, it is to be treated as having made the decision. And having made it, the
authority must act accordingly.
3 5
C. ULTRA VIRES CASES
In the cases illustrated above the doctrine of estoppel was only recognized
when the information had been given by an officer who was responsible for the
distribution of such information or for the performance of the relevant adminis-
trative action, or when the substance of the information duly given by a
31. [1976] 73 D.L.R. (3d) 18, 34-35 (Lacouri~re, J.A.).
32. [19761 I.C.R. 170 (C.A. 1975).
33. [1973] 30 D.L.R.(3d) 386 (Ontario High Ct.).
34. Id. at 392 (Pennell, J.).
35. McDonald, supra note 17, at 180-81.
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responsible authority lay within the competence of that authority.3 6 This
limitation of the doctrine of estoppel was to some degree tacitly assumed, but
was also in certain circumstances expressly mentioned. For example, one court
noted that "The Liverpool decision . . . imposed on the Minister, in accordance
with natural justice if not by estoppel, the duty not to give approval to the
unmodified official plan without referring the matter to the Municipal Board for
a public hearing, in accordance with his statutory duty and the assurances
given." 37 On the other hand, some newer cases presuppose a certain binding of
the administration even in cases where either the informant was not the
responsible person or the information given was ultra vires.
1. England
The initial judgment in England in this direction was that of the King's Bench
Division in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions.38 In this case the plaintiff was
injured during his army service. A medical examination found him to be no
longer fit for service. He then applied to the War Office for a pension. Without
informing the Minister of Pensions, the War Office replied that his incapacity to
work was attributable to his army service. In reliance upon this reply the
petitioner undertook no further steps to obtain an independent medical opinion or
to assure the storage of the X-ray exposures, which subsequently went missing.
The King's Bench Division had to decide whether the Minister of Pensions was
bound by the War Office's reply. Lord Denning came to the conclusion that the
Minister of Pensions was bound by the War Office's reply for the following
reasons:
The case fell within the principle that if a man gives a promise or assurance which he
intends to be binding on him, and to be acted on by the person to whom it was given,
then, once it is acted upon, he is bound by it .... The next question is whether the
assurance is binding on the Crown. The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels
do not bind the Crown, for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown
escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, i.e., the doctrine that the
Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action.
39
In this case, the information was given to the plaintiff by the wrong authority,
but was substantively correct, and the plaintiff was not in a position to recognize
that the War Office was the responsible authority. "That was, on the face of it,
an authoritative decision intended to be binding and intended to be acted on.
Even if Colonel Robertson had studied the Royal Warrant in every detail, there
36. Jaillard v. City of Montreal, [1934] 72 C.S. 112; Cit6 de Montrdal v. Hopital Voghel Inc.,
[19621 B.R. 497; Ville de Montr6al v. The New Cheetah Club "69" Ltd., 119731 C.A. 375 (Q.B.);
Dame St-Pierre v. Ville de Villeneuve, [1969] C.S. 544; The Queen v. B.V.D. Co., [1952] Ex.C.R.
191.
37. Re Multi-Malls Inc. & Minister of Transp., [1976] 73 D.L.R.(3d) 18, 34-35 (Ontario C.A.)
(Lacouri~re, J.A.) (emphasis added).
38. 119481 2 All E.R. 767 (K.B.).
39. Id. at 770.
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would have been nothing to lead him to suppose that the decision was not
authoritative."
40
This decision was criticized in a series of judgments, particularly in the
decision of the House of Lords. 4 1 Nonetheless in Lever Finance Ltd. v.
Westminster Corp.42 Lord Denning reiterated and expanded upon his reasoning
in Robertson. In this case the responsible construction authority had approved a
plan of Lever Finance for building a housing complex. After the commencement
of construction the company modified the plan and sent the authority a copy of
the new plan. In the course of a telephone conversation, without having the
original in front of him, the responsible planning officer incorrectly informed the
architect, "quite clearly . . . the alterations were not material, and that therefore
he had no objection and no further consent was required. ' 4 3 Relying on this
information Lever Finance proceeded with construction. Upon detecting the
error the authority refused to approve the new application.
After referring to earlier precedents, Lord Denning departed from them by
declaring: "Those statements must now be taken with considerable reserve." 44
He referred to the reasoning in his previous decisions on this subject, stating:
[I]f an officer, acting within the scope of his ostensible authority, makes a representa-
tion on which another acts, then a public authority may be bound by it, just as much
as a private concern would be. . . . So here it has been the practice of the local
authority, and of many others, to allow their planning officers to tell applicants whether
a variation is material or not. Are they now to be allowed to say that that practice was
all wrong? I do not think so. It was a matter within the ostensible authority of the
planning officer; and, being acted on, it is binding on the council. 45
Whereas Lord Denning made it clear in Robertson that the reply of the War
Office reflected the actual legal situation, he emphasized in Lever that the
"planning officer made a mistake." The position was thus precisely the opposite
of that prevailing in Robertson. In the one case an unauthorized body gave
information which was objectively and legally correct and in the other the officer
responsible gave information beyond his own competence. This decision means
that it must be assumed that an authority may even be bound in ultra vires cases,
provided either an unauthorized officer gives information which is legally correct
or an authorized officer exceeds his sphere of competence.
This expansion of the grounds upon which an administration may be bound by
its own decisions has also found favor in literature on the topic:
40. Id. at 769.
41. Howell v. Falmouth Boat Constr. Co., [1951] A.C. 837; Southend-on-Sea Corp. v. Hodgson
(Wickford) Ltd., [1962] 1 Q.B. 416; Wells v. Minister of Hous. & Local Gov't, [1967] 1 W.L.R.
1000 (C.A.).
42. [1970] 3 All E.R. 496.
43. Id. at 498.
44. Id. at 500.
45. Id. at 500, 501.
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Ainsi, l'Administration publique est lie par une information lorsque son contenu est
conforme A la Idgislation applicable et que le pr6pos6 qui l'a donn6e dtait autorisd A le
faire. Certains juges, plus innovateurs, ont pourtant ddcid6, soit en e<forqant> la notion
de l'intra vires, soit en se fondant sur la doctrine de l'ostensible authority, que
l'Administration 6tait lie m6me si, au sens strict, il y avait exc~s de juridiction.46
Another source states:
Despite trenchant criticism from the House of Lords, Lord Denning has persisted in his
view that individuals who deal with public officials should not be prejudiced by relying
on the representations made by officials with apparent authority whom they reasonably,
though erroneously, believe to be acting within their legal powers.
47
The expansion of the doctrine of estoppel as expressed in Lever has recently
again been limited. In Western Fish Products v. Penwith Dist. Council48 the
English Court of Appeal held:
In any event, an estoppel could not be raised to prevent a statutory body exercising its
statutory discretion or performing its statutory duty, and therefore, even if the council's
officers while acting in the apparent scope of their authority had purported to determine
the plaintiffs' planning application in advance, that was not binding on the council
because it alone had power under the 1971 Act to determine the applications.49
The doctrine of estoppel is thus applicable in two types of cases. First, if an
authority delegates responsibility for a decision that is within its sphere of
competence to one of its officers, it is bound by his decision.5 ° Second, an
authority cannot rely on a procedural requirement not being fulfilled if it has
decided not to insist on such fulfillment.
5 1
This limitation of the doctrine of estoppel in construction law is explicable in
terms of the purpose of these regulations. Justice requires that not only the
interests of the builder but also those of the potentially affected neighbors be
taken into account.
But then comes the difficulty, and the real danger of injustice. To permit the estoppel
no doubt avoided an injustice to the plaintiffs. But it also may fairly be regarded as
having caused an injustice to one or more members of the public, the owners of adjacent
houses who would be adversely affected by this wrong and careless decision of the
planning officer that the modifications were not material. Yet they were not, and it
would seem could not, be heard. How, in their absence, could the court balance the
respective injustices according as the court did or did not hold that there was an
estoppel in favour of the plaintiffs? What "equity" is there in holding, if such be the
effect of the decision, that the potential injustice to a third party, as a result of the
granting of the estoppel is irrelevant?
5 2
46. Pelletier, Les consequences juridiques des informations errongesfournies par les prposgs de
l'Administration publique, 23 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT [C. DE D.] 356 (1982).
47. Evans, Delegation and Estoppel in Administrative Law, 1971 MODERN L. REv. 335, 340.
48. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204.
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 219.
51. Id. at 221.
52. Id. (Megaw, L.J.).
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This judgment in particular shows clearly that the limitation of the doctrine of
estoppel in construction law is primarily directed at preventing injustice to
neighbors. This limitation does, however, appear to be applicable to areas
outside that of building and construction. In Rootkin v. Kent County Council53
the Court of Appeal referred to the earlier decisions in determining that a public
authority cannot bind itself to exercise its discretionary powers in a particular
manner.
2. Canada
There exist a number of Canadian decisions which have not incorporated the
recent English judgments and continue to proceed from the assumption that
administrators cannot be bound with respect to acts which are ultra vires. 54 Even
this principle, however, is not without controversy. In Silver's Garage Ltd. v.
Bridgewater the Supreme Court for the first time expressed some doubts on this
issue:
After having read a great many of the authorities, I am satisfied that where a municipal
corporation has entered into a contract by resolution of its council, the absence of the
formality of a by-law or an agreement under seal is not necessarily fatal to the claim of
the other contracting party if he has performed his part of the contract and the
corporation has accepted the benefit of it.
55
In the same way there have been some cases in which the relevant authority
was held to be bound by its acts in spite of a breach of statutory regulations:
The material before me indicates that a practice [which was deficient under the zoning
by-law] has developed and has been followed by builders and by the city of breaking
a building permit into three stages: excavation, foundation and superstructure erection.
I do not think it appropriate for the city to now resist mandamus by saying to the
applicants . . . you should have done something that was not the agreed and accepted
mode of procedure which was adopted and followed by the city and by builders .56
These cases suggest that the Canadian courts are disposed to concur with the
more recent English decisions to the extent that estoppel becomes a possibility
when merely procedural regulations have been breached. On the other hand there
appear to have been no Canadian cases where Lever has been applied. In this
context, two cases which deal with the doctrine of estoppel in the context of
citizenship and immigration law are of particular interest.
In Gill v. The Queen57 two Indian citizens were only allowed to enter Canada
after having committed themselves to depart Canada on a certain day and after
53. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1186.
54. Re Ormerod and Township of Ancaster, [19721 21 D.L.R.(3d) 541 (Ontario High Ct.); Re
David Gallo Bldg. Co. & City of Toronto, [19741 38 D.L.R. 536 (Ontario High Ct.). Neither case,
however, referred directly to the doctrine of estoppel.
55. [1971] 17 D.L.R.(3d) 1, 9 (Can.) (Ritchie, J.) (emphasis added).
56. Re George Herczeg Ltd. & City of Toronto, [1973] 26 D.L.R.(3d) 165, 168 (Galligan, J.);
see also Chater v. City of Dartmouth, [1975] 62 D.L.R.(3d) 122 (Nova Scotia 1st Div.).
57. [19781 88 D.L.R.(3d) 341 (Can.).
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the plaintiff had deposited a certain amount of money as a guarantee that they
would in fact leave. Before the expiration date they applied to be accepted as
landed immigrants. Their application went to appeal and was not finally rejected
until after the specified date. The responsible immigration officer then decided
that the deposit had been forfeited under section 63 of the Immigration Act.
58
The plaintiff, however, maintained that the officers responsible had given an
assurance that the deposit would not be forfeited as long as the immigration case
was still pending.
The Federal Court rejected the concept of the Crown being bound by the
doctrine of estoppel, without elaborating on precedents dealing with this issue.
Cattanach, J., stated:
In my opinion the evidence does not establish that such representations were made but
even assuming that they were made and the visitors were induced thereby to act to their
detriment that amounts to an invocation of the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine of
estoppel does not lie against the Crown. It is not open to the plaintiff to set up an
estoppel to prevent the operation of the statute nor can representations made by
department officers preclude the operation of the statute. 59
This decision of the Federal Court, taken literally, is diametrically opposed to
the Canadian and English precedents. As stated above, the Crown cannot be
prevented from exercising its discretionary powers where they exist. It is,
however, bound by any such exercise. Section 63 of the Immigration Act did not
provide for any compulsory forfeiture of the deposit. A decision in this respect
lay rather within the discretion of the responsible immigration officer. The
immigration officer had exercised this discretion by giving an assurance that the
deposit would not be forfeited as long as the immigration case was pending, and
according to the existing precedents he was bound by this decision. McDonald
expressed a similar view:
I do not see how the operation of the statute would have been defeated since the statute
did not require forfeiture; it authorized the immigration officer to make an order of
forfeiture, and in exercise of that authority the immigration officer had decided that
forfeiture was not appropriate in particular circumstances.
60
The Gill decision thus appears not to have revolved around the applicability of
the doctrine of estoppel. The Federal Court appears rather to have relied to a not
inconsiderable degree on the conviction that the immigration officer had made no
such assurance:
In my opinion the evidence does not establish that such representations were made but
even assuming that they were made and the visitors were induced thereby to act to their
detriment that amounts to an invocation of the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine of
estoppel does not lie against the Crown.
6 1
58. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-2 (1970).
59. [1978] 88 D.L.R.(3d) at 345.
60. McDonald, supra note 17, at 168 n.39.
61. [1978] 88 D.L.R.(3d) at 345 (emphasis added).
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This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the Federal Court did not in
any way address the precedents on estoppel. In addition, the Federal Court did
not recognize the plaintiff as the legal claimant:
Inasmuch as the deposits were forfeited, there was no debt owing to the aliens which
could be assigned to the plaintiff. In any event, a Crown debt is not assignable accept
[sic] under the provisions of section 80 of the Financial Administration Act,
R.S.Canada 1970, c. F-10, or any other Act of Parliament, and there was no such
assignment. The powers of attorney did not amount to equitable assignments but were
merely directions to pay to the plaintiff any moneys owing to the aliens. They created
no right of action in the plaintiff against the Crown even if the moneys had become
payable to the aliens.
62
It may thus be argued that the comments on the doctrine of estoppel in this case
should only be seen as obiter dicta.
With the decision of the Federal Court decision in In re Citizenship Act and in
re Holvenstot 63 the Canadian courts seem, on the other hand, to have accepted
to some extent Lord Denning's approach in Lever. In Holvenstot the appellant
had made an application for naturalization. This application was rejected by the
authorities on the grounds that the appellant had been charged under section 6 of
the Narcotic Control Act.64 The trial had, however, been stayed under section
508(1) of the Criminal Code. 65 According to section 508(2) of the Criminal Code
the trial could be reactivated at any time within one year of the stay of
proceedings. A stay as such would in no way hinder a possible continuation of
proceedings. The Court concluded that:
[I]t seems clear that because of subsection 508(2) [Criminal Code], no constraint on the
Crown's future action on the charge arose because of the stay alone. For the statutory
period mentioned there, the Crown is expressly permitted to continue proceedings on
a stayed charge. Furthermore, it has been held that apart entirely from subsection
508(2) proceedings on a stayed charge may be continued without any need to proceed
by way of fresh prosecution for the same offense: See Regina v. McLeod (1970) 74
W.W.R. 319 (B.C. Supreme Court). 66
For this reason the appellant was, in the opinion of the responsible authorities,
still "a person charged with an indictable offense." Accordingly the granting of
Canadian citizenship was impossible due to section 20(1)(b) of the Citizenship
Act.67 Subsequent to the rejection of application for naturalization the appellant's
attorney received a letter from the relevant authorities, containing inter alia the
following statement: "I am writing further to your letter of April 9, 1981,
regarding Ms. Holvenstot. This is to advise you that the Crown does not intend
62. Id. at 342.
63. [19821 2 F.C. 279 (1981) (Vancouver 1st Div.).
64. Narcotic Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. N-I (1970).
65. Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34 (1970).
66. [1982] 2 F.C. at 280.
67. Citizenship Act, Can. Stat. ch. 108 (1974-75-76).
VOL. 24, NO. 2
ESTOPPEL: AN ANALYSIS 423
to take further proceedings against Ms. Holvenstot on the charge of cultivating
marihuana. Trusting this is the information you require..."68
The Federal Court was thus faced with the issue of whether the Crown was
prevented from continuing proceedings against the appellant by virtue of the
above letter. An affirmative answer would mean that section 20(l)(b) of the
Citizenship Act would no longer stand in the way of the appellant's naturaliza-
tion, as she would no longer be a "person charged with an indictable offense."
Verchere, D.J., referred to the English precedents:
It has been said, and I accept it as correct, that an estoppel can bind the Crown: see
Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227. There Denning, J., as he then
was, held that a letter . . . fell within the principle "that if a man gives a promise or
assurance which he intends to be binding on him, and to be acted on by the person to
whom it was given, then, once it is acted upon, he is bound by it" [at page 231], and
accordingly found in favour of the appellant. 6
9
Verchere, D.J., applied these criteria to the case at hand and came to the
conclusion that the Crown was indeed estopped from continuing proceedings
under the Narcotic Control Act:
70
It seems to me reasonably certain from the date of the letter, the contents of it and the
prompt use to which the appellant put it that that use was in fact intended. That is to
say, it seems reasonably certain that it was written and given to make it appear that the
charge which had prohibited a grant of citizenship to the appellant need no longer be
taken into account. The prosecutor apparently considered that if the Crown should
obtain evidence in support of the charge which it was said was then lacking, it would
be open to it to proceed by way of fresh prosecution. Hence, it would seem no term was
expressed (nor can one be implied) that the Crown was free to revoke its decision at its
pleasure and that being so, it seems to me that further proceedings on the charge must
be estopped and that, just as the doctrine of executive necessity was held inapplicable
in the Robertson case, it is equally inapplicable here. 7 1
Prior to this decision the precedents were relatively clear. If the statute itself
determined the rights and obligations in question (first group of cases: "the
statute speaks for itself"), then the administration was not bound by estoppel.
The doctrine of estoppel was only applicable where the rights and obligations had
been more clearly determined by an administrative act (second group of cases:
"the statute defines the rights in terms of determination").
The Holvenstot decision, however, augurs a change of course in the judgments.
It would appear on the face of it that Holvenstot is only relevant to the second group
of cases. This is because the Crown had discretionary powers under section 508(2)
of the Criminal Code to reactivate within one year proceedings stayed under
section 508(1) of the Code. In this regard the decision certainly fits into the second
category of cases in which estoppel is considered to be a possibility.
68. [198212 F.C. at 281.
69. [198212 F.C. at 281.
70. Narcotic Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. N-I (1970).
71. [198212 F.C. at 281.
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Holvenstot, however, is also of significance for the first category of cases, as
the statute did not expressly empower the Crown to truncate the period of one
year envisaged in section 508(2) of the Criminal Code. If one thus acknowledges
the possibility of estoppel, then the Crown clearly has the power to shorten the
period set by the statute. To this extent the decision belongs to the first group of
cases. The Holvenstot case may thus be seen as having acknowledged the
applicability of the doctrine of estoppel for the first group of cases ("the statute
speaks for itself").
The altered approach of the Canadian Courts has been reflected in several
subsequent decisions.7 2 In Mentuk v. The Queen, McNair, J., held as follows:
In my view, the doctrine of promissory estoppel must be perceived as playing an
important supplementary part in reinforcing the leading roles of expectation and
reliance. If there is one prong of the defendant's case that should be blunted and
diverted by the shield of estoppel it is the insistence on strict legal rights in the context
of the plaintiff being regarded as a mere supplicant and the spoken word as evincing
nothing more than an intention to negotiate toward a possible settlement. Expectation
and reliance, buttressed by estoppel, all come down to the same thing: the defendant
gave promises or assurances to the plaintiff on which the latter could reasonably be
expected to rely and did in fact rely to his detriment and it would be unjust and
inequitable in the circumstances to allow the defendant to afterwards go back on those
promises and assurances. 73
In Optical Recording Corp. v. Canada74 the applicant, a Canadian corpora-
tion, acted in accordance with a notice of assessment of the Minister of National
Revenue. The departmental policy was, however, beyond the contemplation of
subsection 195(2) of the Income Tax Act. As the Minister had no lawful authority
to thwart the application of subsection 195(2) of the Act, the extralegal policy
was illegal. Despite his assurances to the contrary, the Minister subsequently
issued requirements to pay and garnishing orders. The Federal Court held that the
Minister was estopped from benefitting from the garnishments so obtained:
The respondents [The Queen and the Minister of National Revenue], by illegal abuse
of authority and false inducements, are clearly estopped from taking any benefit from
their sudden garnishments of the applicant's accounts. They are justly estopped even in
public law and even although the benefit taken is not for personal gain but for the public
purse. The principle of estoppel here is closely akin to that other long and hardy fibre
in the web of our law, ex turpi causa non oritur actio. The Minister cannot be permitted
to put a taxpayer to prejudicial disadvantage by invocation of illegal administrative
means of the Minister's own invention, which unlawfully induced the taxpayer into a
highly vulnerable position.
75
72. See the cases cited below, as well as Aetna Casualty du Canada Compagnie d'Assurance v.
Canada, F.C. 7.5.1987, T-2155-83 (1987). See also the decision in The Queen v. Canadian Air
Traffic Control Ass'n, [1984] 1 F.C. 1081, which emphasized the need for a clear and unambiguous
promise by words or by conduct as a prerequisite for estoppel.
73. [19861 3 F.C. 249.
74. [1987] 1 F.C. 339.
75. [19871 1 F.C. at 361.
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A similar position was taken by Hugessen, J., in Granger v. Employment and
Immigration Commission:
The commission's position is, then, quite simple. It frankly admits that its first
interpretation was wrong. It does not dispute the fact it gave this interpretation to the
applicant and others, and that the applicant acted on the basis of such information. As
this information was incorrect, the acts which the applicant thought were to his
advantage were really to his detriment. If he had obtained correct information at the
proper time, he could have made a different and a more advantageous choice. However,
it has not only the power but the duty to apply the text of the statute in all its rigour to
the applicant's case: dura lex, sed lex-so much the worse for him!
In my view, this attitude is not acceptable. There may have been a time when the courts
could close their eyes to reality and say that, however unfair the results might be,
Parliament intended that the statute should always be applied. The individual relied at
his peril on the interpretation of the legislation given by the authorities. 76
In this case, however, the majority of the Federal Court dismissed the applicant's
action on the grounds that the Crown was not bound by the Department's
representations if the latter were contrary to clear and peremptory provisions of law.
It is thus clear that the law continues to be in a state of flux in determining the extent
to which the doctrine of estoppel may be applied against the government.
3. United States
The key U.S. cases in this area of the doctrine of estoppel are Federal Crop
Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,77 Moser v. United States,7 8 and Schweiker v. Hansen.79
In Merrill the respondents applied for a crop insurance policy from the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), and disclosed that the wheat to be insured
had already been sown. The County Committee, as the responsible organ of the
FCIC, informed the respondents that the wheat had been insured. The first
insurance payment was then made. Following this, the respondents sent a written
application to the office of the FCIC in Denver, where it was accepted.
Subsequently, the wheat was virtually totally ruined by drought. The FCIC was
empowered to insure the wheat in question, but had determined, "as a matter of
policy," not to insure it. The FCIC had published a notice to this effect in the
Federal Register. Neither the respondents nor the County Committee were aware
of the notice.
The United States Supreme Court80 overturned the ruling of the Idaho
Supreme Court, 8' which had applied the doctrine of estoppel in the respondents'
favor. The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court was as follows:
76. [19861 3 F.C. 70, 81.
77. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
78. 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
79. 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
80. Albeit with a majority of only 5:4.
81. '[The plaintiffs] purchased the insurance in question in good faith and thereafter suffered a
loss. The [Corporation] through its agent had knowledge of the material facts. It is now estopped
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The case no doubt presents phases of hardship. We take for granted that, on the basis
of what they were told by the Corporation's local agent, the respondents reasonably
believed that their entire crop was covered by petitioner's insurance. And so we assume
that recovery could be had against a private insurance company. But the insurance
company is not a private insurance company. It is too late in the day to urge that the
Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with liability,
whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprise or
engages in competition with private ventures.
82
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Moser v. United States,
83
made only four years later, provides a clear contrast to Merrill. Moser, a Swiss
national, had applied to be exempted from military service during the Second
World War due to his status as a "neutral alien." This application was made on
the advice of the Swiss Legation, which had informed him that he would not
thereby lose the right to become an American citizen. This information was
incorrect, but it was not possible to ascertain whether the State Department had
misinformed the Swiss Legation.
The Supreme Court determined that the legal position was clear and reasoned
that "as a matter of law, the statute imposed a valid condition on the claim of a
neutral alien for exemption; petitioner had a choice of exemption and no
citizenship, or no exemption and citizenship. ' 84 Without expressly mentioning
the doctrine of estoppel, the Supreme Court 85 held the State Department to be
bound by the information given by the Swiss Legation:
The express waiver of citizenship had been deleted. Petitioner had sought information
and guidance from the highest authority to which he could turn, and was advised to sign
Revised Form 301. He was led to believe that he would not thereby lose his rights to
citizenship. If he had known otherwise he would not have claimed exemption. In
justifiable reliance on this advice he signed the papers sent to him by the Legation....
We do not overlook the fact that the Revised Form 301 contained a footnote reference
to the statutory provision [any person who makes such application-for exemption
from military service as a neutral alien-shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a
citizen of the United States], and that the Legation wrote petitioner "you will not waive
your right to apply for American citizenship papers." The footnote might have given
pause to a trained lawyer. A lawyer might have speculated on the possible innuendoes
in the use of the phrase "right to apply," as opposed to "right to obtain." But these are
minor distractions in a total setting which understandably lulled this petitioner into
misconception of the legal consequences of applying for exemption." 86
The Court in Davis outlined the significance and consequences of this
decision:
from denying the validity of the insurance contract," Merrill v. FCIC, 67 Idaho 196, 200, 174 P.2d
834, 836 (1946).
82. 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1980) (Frankfurter, J.).
83. 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
84. 341 U.S. 41, 46 (1951) (Minton, J.).
85. The decision was unanimous.
86. 341 U.S. 41, 46 (1951) (Minton, J.).
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Among the many interesting propositions of law that lurk in the Moser opinion, two are
especially fascinating: (1) the Swiss Legation by writing a letter to a Swiss citizen
changed the effect of a statute enacted by Congress. The statute gave Moser a choice
between citizenship and military exemption, but not both; the letter gave him both, and
the unanimous court followed the letter rather than the statute. (2) Moser was not
presumed to know law; he was not presumed to know even the statutory law that was
set forth in clear and understandable terms on the application blank he signed.87
The third key case, Schweiker v. Hansen,88 once again restricted the applica-
bility of the doctrine of estoppel in certain areas. In this case, a representative of
the Social Security Administration had interviewed the respondent and informed
her incorrectly that she was not entitled to any "mother's insurance benefits." The
respondent therefore did not attempt to submit a written application for the
benefits. One year later, she learned that this information was incorrect. She then
applied for and was awarded the benefits. However, the Social Security Admin-
istration refused to pay the amount in question for the previous year.
Both the District Court for the District of Vermont and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit had decided in favor of the respondent. The United States
Supreme Court overturned these decisions8 9 and held:
This Court has never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will
estop the Government from insisting upon compliance with valid regulations governing
the distribution of welfare benefits. In two cases involving denial of citizenship, the
Court has declined to decide whether even "affirmative misconduct" would estop the
Government from denying citizenship, for in neither case was "affirmative miscon-
duct" involved . . . The Court has recognized, however, the "duty of all courts to
observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury" . . .
Lower federal courts have recognized that duty also, and consistently have relied on
Merrill in refusing to estop the Government where an eligible applicant has lost Social
Security benefits because of possible erroneous replies to oral inquiries . . . this is
another in that line of cases, for we are convinced that [the representative's]
conduct-which the majority conceded to be less than "affirmative misconduct," 619
F.2d, at 948-does not justify the abnegation of that duty.9°
The decision of the Supreme Court limits the applicability of estoppel in social
security cases. It is, however, questionable whether there was to be a general
limitation placed on the principles of estoppel expounded in Moser. This is
because the Supreme Court in this decision did allow for the possibility of
estoppel against the United States, without stating the necessary conditions.
Subsequent decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals have confirmed the analysis
that the authorities may in certain situations be estopped.
In Miranda v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 91 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the unexplained period of eighteen
87. 4 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 8 (2d ed. 1983).
88. 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
89. Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting.
90. 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1968).
91. 638 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1980).
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months required by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for the pro-
cessing of a visa application was "affirmative misconduct." The INS was therefore
directed to treat the visa application "as if it were approved." 92 This Court of
Appeals judgment thereby preserved the continuity of its previous judgments. 93
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals First Circuit in Akbarin v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service94 also confirmed the limited range of the
Supreme Court's decision in Hansen. In this case the plaintiff had commenced
employment without having received the necessary permit. His action was thus
inconsistent with both the law and his status as a nonimmigrant alien. In the
course of a telephone conversation, however, with an official of the INS who
could not subsequently be identified, the plaintiff had received the advice that
he was entitled to work up to twenty hours per week. The court distinguished
the case at hand from Hansen stating that "Hansen itself is not otherwise
helpful here because the decision seems to rest to some degree on the fact that
the estoppel 'threaten[ed] the public fisc.' The immigration question in this
case does not.'
95
A further significant difference lay in the fact that Hansen was concerned with
the misinterpretation of a noncoercive regulation. In this case, however, the court
had to decide whether the doctrine of estoppel could be applied despite the
breach of a coercive federal statute.
In 1984 the United States Supreme Court once again addressed the question of
estoppel against the government in Heckler v. Community Health Services,9 6 and
once again it preferred to leave the issue unsettled.9 7 It did, however, enunciate
some of the rules governing the application of the doctrine of estoppel. The U.S.
Supreme Court firstly stated the underlying principle:
When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has
given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule
of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may
not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant. 98
A further significant issue addressed was the extent to which the public fisc is
affected by the conduct of government agents:
Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with
scrupulous regard for the requirements of law; respondent could expect no less than to
be held to the most demanding standards in its quest for public funds. This is consistent
92. Id. at 84.
93. See, e.g., Villena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980).
94. 669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982).
95. Id. at 843.
96. 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
97. "Petitioner urges us to expand this principle into a flat rule that estoppel may not in any
circumstances run against the Government. We have left this issue open in the past, and do so again
today." Id. at 60.
98. Id.
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with the general rule that those who deal with the Government are expected to know the
law and may not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to law.99
The line of reasoning adopted by the United States Supreme Court in this case
sits squarely with that of the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Akbarin v. INS, too where this criterion was viewed as being decisive.
Various decisions of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals illustrate the less than
pristine clarity of the law in this area. Each of these courts has dealt with the issue
of estoppel against the government. There has been unanimity in the call for the
traditional elements of the doctrine of estoppel to be present. Thus anyone
invoking estoppel must prove that (1) the authorities gave false or inaccurate
information which he (2) reasonably and in good faith relied on, and that he (3)
thereby incurred some kind of loss. 10 1 The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,
however, are also unanimous in their judgment that these traditional elements are
of themselves not sufficient. 102 It is in the question as to which additional elements
are required for a successful application of the doctrine of estoppel against the
government that the views tend to diverge. The First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, Federal and, more recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
view "affirmative misconduct" of the government as a fourth element. 103
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was of the view that the
doctrine of estoppel can only be applied if "it does not interfere with underlying
government policies or unduly undermine the correct enforcement of a particular
law or regulation." 104
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated in Boulez v.
Commissioner'0 5 that "claims of estoppel arising from the behavior of govern-
mental employees may be asserted only in a narrow category of circumstances."
99. Id. at 63.
100. 669 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1982).
101. United States v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907, 912 (3d Cir. 1987).
102. See, e.g., id. at 912 ("It is, however, well-settled that the Government may not be estopped
on the same terms as any other litigant.").
103. Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1982); Long Island Radio Co. v. National Labor
Relations Bd., 841 F.2d 474, 478 (2d Cir. 1988); Scime v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1987);
Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907 (3d Cir.
1987); Taneja v. Smith, 795 F.2d 355,358 (4th Cir. 1986); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155,
1158 (7th Cir. 1982); Mukherjee v. INS, 793 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Office of
Personnel Management; 833 F.2d 1568, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Maynard v. Sayles, 823 F.2d 1277,
1281 (8th Cir. 1987); Boyd v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 624, 628 (8th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Manning, 787 F.2d
431, 436 (8th Cir. 1986). The question was left open in Chula Vista City School Dist. v. Bennett,
824 F.2d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102,
1108 (1st Cir. 1986); Phelps v. Federal Emer. Management Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986);
Emanuel v. Marsh, 828 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987); Wellington v. INS, 710 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1983).
It was restrictively applied in Crown v. United States R.R., 811 F.2d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 1987); Azar
v. United States Postal Service, 777 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985).
104. Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1416 (10th Cir. 1984).
105. 810 F.2d 209, 218 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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In Simmons v. United States 106 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
applied the doctrine of estoppel against the government but did not determine
whether "affirmative misconduct" was a necessary prerequisite. Neither did this
court assume a position on the issue in Jones v. Dep't of Health & Human
Services. 107 It restricted its decision to determining that oral information in the
absence of additional factors is insufficient. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit was of a similar view that the traditional elements are inadequate,
but did not define any further requirements. 108
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Lyden v. Howerton
10 9
expressly refused to decide whether "affirmative misconduct" was required. In
United States v. Vonderau 010 and United States v. Killough'.. it established two
new requirements, without addressing the "affirmative misconduct" issue. In
addition to the traditional elements, it was necessary that "(2) the Government
must have been acting in its private or proprietary capacity as opposed to its
public or sovereign capacity; and (3) the Government's agent must have been
acting within the scope of his or her authority."'
1 2




The question of the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel to the public
administration in Australia has not been the subject of a great deal of litigation
to date. The leading case decided by the High Court of Australia is Brickworks
Ltd. v. Warringah Shire Council. 114 In this case a company had applied to a local
council for permission to use certain land in order to extract clay and shale. The
106. 308 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1962).
107. 843 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1988).
108. West Augusta Dev. Corp. v. Giuffrida, 717 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1983); S.E.C. v. Blavin, 760
F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985).
109. 783 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986).
110. 837 F.2d 1540, 1541 (llth Cir. 1988).
111. 848 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1988).
112. See also ATC Petroleum, Inc. v. Sanders, 661 F. Supp. 182 (D.D.C. 1987).
113. Rejecting estoppel: U.S. v. One Single Family Residence, Miami, Fla., 683 F. Supp. 783
(S.D. Fla. 1988), even when "affirmative misconduct" is present; United States v. Roper, 681 F.
Supp. 77 (D. Me. 1988), existence of "oral representation"; Hampshire Mfg. v. United States, 667
F. Supp. 874 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), concerning tax issues. Allowing estoppel: United States v.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Colo. 1987); Great Am. Credit Corp. v. Wilmington
Housing Auth., 680 F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1988); Younghee Na Huck v. Attorney General, 676 F.
Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. 189 (D.N.J. 1987);
St. Charles Assocs., Ltd. v. United States, 671 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Md. 1987); Connecticut Funds for
Environment, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 1987); United States v. Wood, 658
F. Supp. 1561 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Wagner v. Director, Fed. Emer. Management Agency, 658 F. Supp.
1530 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Question left open: United States v. Dakota, 666 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich.
1985).
114. 108 C.L.R. 568 (1963).
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company received a document from the council to the effect that the application
would be approved, subject to certain conditions. The council subsequently
brought proceedings against the company alleging noncompliance with the stated
conditions. The council also claimed that no approval had in fact been granted.
Windeyer, J., reiterated the traditional doctrine as it had been applied to the first
group of cases examined above ("the statute speaks for itself"):
... an estoppel seems to me to arise. The Council did not at any time before it
commenced this suit repudiate what its President had told the Company. In effect it
repeated it. And the Company relied upon these purported consents. Does not this
found an estoppel? It was argued that it could not do so because estoppel by
representation cannot prevent the performance of a statutory duty or the exercise of a
statutory discretion. There is no doubt about this principle; but I doubt its application
to this case.1 5
The High Court was not, however, inclined to interpret the doctrine in a narrow
manner, and came to the conclusion that a public administration is bound by its
actions when it mistakenly leads an applicant to believe that it had exercised a
discretion in the applicant's favor:
It seems to me that, in the circumstances of this case, the Council was estopped from
denying that it had exercised its discretion in the manner it had said it had done. The
case is not, as I see it, one in which a consent once given could be withdrawn. That
could only, I think, be so if the consent were expressly given upon a condition that it
might be withdrawn in specified events. And, moreover, it is not now said that consent
was given and later withdrawn. The allegation is that it was never given. 116
It appears that this area of the law has not yet been exhaustively examined by
the courts. There have, however, been developments in Australia in the area of
torts which differ from those in some other common law jurisdictions and would
possibly enable an applicant to at least gain financial relief in an action against
a public authority, although specific performance would be excluded.
It has become an established rule that public administrations may be held
liable for financial loss resulting from the tort of negligent misstatement in just
the same way as private persons. This principle, developed in relation to the
private sphere through the English case Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller &
Partners Ltd. 117 has been widely applied in Australian cases against public
administrations. 118
According to the rule in Hedley Byrne, a duty of care arises when a person
with special skills or knowledge gives information or advice to others who would
be reasonably expected to rely on such information or advice, or allows such
115. 108 C.L.R. 568, 577 (1963) (emphasis added).
116. 108 C.L.R. 568, 577 (1963) (Windeyer, J.).
117. [1964] A.C. 465.
118. See, e.g., Hull v. Cantebury Mun. Council, [1974] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 300; G. J. Knight
Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Warringah Shire Council, [1975] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 796; Freeman v. Shoalhaven
Shire Council, [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 826; Johnson v. South Aust. [1980] 26 S.A.St.R. 1;
L. Shaddock & Assocs. v. Parramatta City Council, 150 C.L.R. 225 (1980).
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information or advice to be passed on to others in circumstances in which the
skilled person knew or ought to have known that the recipient would rely on it.
The High Court of Australia clearly approved of and applied Hedley Byrne in
Mutual Life and Citizen's Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Evatt. 119 Barwick, C.J., defined
the circumstances in which a duty of care shall arise:
First of all, I think the circumstances must be such as to have caused the speaker or be
calculated to cause a reasonable person in the position of the speaker to realize that he
is being trusted by the recipient of the information or advice to give information which
the recipient believes the speaker to possess or to which the recipient believes the
speaker to have access or to give advice, about a matter upon or in respect of which the
recipient believes the speaker to possess a capacity or opportunity for judgment, in
either case the subject matter of the information or advice being of a serious or business
nature. It seems to me that it is this element of trust which the one has of the other which
is at the heart of the relevant relationship . . . Then the speaker must realize or the
circumstances must be such that he ought to have realized that the recipient intends to
act upon the information or advice in respect of his property or of himself in connexion
with some matter of business or serious consequence . . . Further, it seems to me that
the circumstances must be such that it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the
recipient to seek, or to accept, and to rely upon the utterance of the speaker. 120
The appellant subsequently appealed from the High Court of Australia to the
English Privy Council, 121 where the scope of this general principle was limited
considerably. 122 The Privy Council determined that the tort of negligent mis-
statement only arose when information or advice was given by three categories
of persons: first, those carrying on a business or profession in which advice is
given which requires special skill or competence; second, those expressly pro-
claiming their skill or competence in a particular area and giving advice or
information which they know, or ought to know, is to be relied on; and third, those
with a financial interest in the subject matter of the advice or information given.
The limitations imposed by the Privy Council in Evatt were subsequently
removed by the High Court of Australia in L. Shaddock & Associates v.
Parramatta City Council. 123 In this case a firm intended to buy land for
redevelopment. Before the purchase was completed the firm's solicitor inquired
of the local council whether any road-widening plans existed for the land in
question. A council officer replied in the negative. The firm's solicitor then
applied for and was given a council certificate declaring the status of the land
with respect to zoning and town planning matters. The certificate made no
mention of any road-widening plans, although it was the council's practice to
include any such plans, should they exist, in the certificate. The firm thus
119. [19711 A.C. 793.
120. 122 C.L.R. 556, 571 (1968).
121. Mutual Life and Citizen's Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 793.
122. The right to appeal from the Australian High Court or the respective State Supreme Courts
to the Privy Council no longer exists. The same principle applies for Canada.
123. 150 C.L.R. 225 (1981).
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proceeded with the purchase, relying on the information in the certificate. It
subsequently discovered that road-widening plans for the land had been approved
by the council two years before the firm's inquiries. The firm successfully sued
the council for damages for negligent misstatement.
The High Court referred to its own decision in Evatt, expressly rejecting the
Privy Council's more narrow interpretation of the requirements for negligent
misstatement. According to Mason, J.:
[W]henever a person gives information or advice to another upon a serious matter in
circumstances where the speaker realises, or ought to realise, that he is being trusted to
give the best of his information or advice as a basis for action on the part of the other
party and it is reasonable in the circumstances for the other party to act on that
information or advice, the speaker comes under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
provision of the information or advice he chooses to give. 124
Referring directly to the application of this principle to public administrations,
Mason, J., stated "[W]hen information (or advice) is sought on a serious matter,
in such circumstances that the authority realises, or ought to realise, that the
enquirer intends to act upon it, a duty of care arises in relation to the provision
of the information and advice."'
125
The High Court also considered the argument that public administrations
could be unduly obstructed in carrying out their statutory functions for the benefit
of the community as a whole if such a duty of care existed. It found no favor with
the Court:
Recognition of the existence of a duty of care and consecuential liability would make
little difference, if any, to the standard of care taken in giving information and advice.
An authority can, if it wishes, obtain protection against liability by means of insurance
... It is improbable that the practice of providing such information would be
discontinued, though it is possible that a fee might be charged and that an endeavour
might be made to exclude liability. 126
This line of reasoning would appear to be directly opposed to that of the
English Court of Appeal in Western Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith District
Council, 127 where it was stated that too high a level of liability might deter
officers in public administrations from providing advice or information, for fear
of legal action. These two views may be reconciled by the fact that in Western
Fish Products the remedy sought was specific performance, thereby possibly
involving an injustice to third parties, whereas in Shaddock it was damages.
III. The Doctrine of Estoppel before International Arbitral Tribunals
A fundamental difficulty in determining the attitude of international arbitral
tribunals to the application of the doctrine of estoppel arises from the fact that
124. 150 C.L.R. 250 (1981).
125. 150 C.L.R. 252-253 (1981).
126. 150 C.L.R. 252 (1981) (Mason, J.).
127. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204; see supra note 52.
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there exist very few published cases on the subject. There are, in fact, only three
main published sources in which at least a cross-section of arbitral awards appear.
These are the decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 128 awards
made under the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) 129 and those under the International Chamber of Commerce
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration. 1
30
Only a few of the reported decisions deal explicitly with the doctrine of
estoppel. The reports of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal are the most
comprehensive sources of material on this topic. The other two sources cited above
are relatively sparse in their treatment of the question. The reason for this may
be found in the fact that the doctrine of estoppel or analogous concepts was
originally applied by international tribunals in the context of international public
law (i.e., between States). Thus the International Court of Justice determined in
Temple ofPreah Vihar, Cambodia v. Thailand that "a State must not be permitted
to benefit by its own inconsistency to the prejudice of another State." 131
In this context the application of the principle of estoppel by international
arbitral tribunals arises out of the recognition of the universality of this principle,
regardless of the different labels that may be given to it in the various legal
systems of the world:
It is a principle of good faith that "a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold-to
affirm at one time and deny at another ... Such a principle has its basis in common
sense and common justice, and whether it is called "estoppel," or by any other name,
it is one which courts of law have in modem times most usefully adopted.
132
It is only comparatively seldom that the arbitral tribunals appear to have dealt
with this question in cases where one of the parties was a private entity:
Although this dictum [that a State must not be permitted to benefit by its own
inconsistency to the prejudice of another State] refers to activities of States, the
Tribunal is of the view that the same general principle is applicable in international
economic relations where private parties are involved. In addition, the Tribunal
considers that, in particular for the applications in international relations, the whole
concept is characterized by the requirement of good faith. 133
In such cases, however, the doctrine of estoppel has indeed been applied by
arbitral tribunals against governments and government agencies in order to
remedy outcomes which would otherwise be inequitable.
128. Published in Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports [lran-U.S. C.T.R.] (Cambridge
1983) and 1976 Y.B.: COM. ARB. (A.J. van den Berg, ed. Deventer).
129. Published in ICSID REVIEW-FOREIGN INV. L.J. (Wash. 1986), JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL (Clunet) and Y.B.: COM. ARB.
130. Published in JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) and Y.B.: COM. ARB.
131. 11962]I.C.J. 6,39-51.
132. B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 141-41 (1953), cited in Oil Field of Tex., Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 376 (1982).
133. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, 23 I.L.M. 351-83 (1984); (Award on
Jurisdiction of Sept. 25, 1983), 10 Y.B.: COM. ARB. 61-71 (1985); 113 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 201-21 (1986).
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There can be little doubt that it has found virtually universal acceptance. "The
doctrine has been invoked in varying forms over a period of a century and a half;
and although there have been occasions on which it has been held to be
inapplicable to the particular facts, its jurisprudential basis has been unchal-
lenged." 134 This statement succinctly expresses the overall attitude of arbitral
tribunals to estoppel. It may in fact be said that arbitral tribunals, when compared
with national courts, proceed from exactly the opposite starting point when
considering the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel against governments or
their agencies. Whilst national courts frequently still tend to see estoppel as an
exception to the general principle that "the King can do no wrong," arbitral
tribunals assume that estoppel is generally applicable unless particular fact
situations preclude it. Some of the essential elements of estoppel as applied
repeatedly by arbitral tribunals and recognized by commentators are as follows:
the statement or conduct must be clear and unambiguous in its effect; the
statement or actions of the person must be capable of being reasonably construed
as having been authorized by the government concerned; and the party claiming
estoppel must have relied in good faith upon the statement or conduct either to
his own detriment or to the advantage of the party responsible for the statement
or conduct. 1
35
As a general observation, it may be said that arbitral tribunals tend to apply
standards for estoppel against governments and their agencies in a manner quite
analogous to that used for private individuals and entities. This is done to a
considerably greater extent than generally occurs in the decisions of national
courts. In view of the independence of such tribunals from the judicial system of
any particular country, this is hardly surprising. Arbitral tribunals have fre-
quently found governments liable on the basis of estoppel in circumstances in
which national courts may well have barred such executive liability. 136 A logical
extension of the hypothesis that estoppel is a universal principle independent of
any particular legal system is the argument that estoppel, or whatever it may be
called in noncommon law jurisdictions, 137 may be applied by arbitral tribunals,
even if it has no formal legislative basis in the country concerned. 1
38
An example of just such a generous application of the principle of estoppel
against government agencies is Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran.1 39 In this case the
claimant, who had business interests in Iran, wished to assign power of attorney
134. MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 468, 479 (1958).
135. See, e.g., Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquiescence,
1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176, 202.
136. Numerous examples can be found in the decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
137. For an overview from a noncommon-law perspective, see Gaillard, Linterdiction de se
contredire au ditriment d'autrui comme principe gineral du droit du commerce international (le
principe de l'estoppel dans quelques sentences arbitrates ricentes), REV. ARB. 241 (1985).
138. See MacGibbon, supra note 134, at 478.
139. 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 230 (1987) (see in particular the concurring opinion of Musk, J.).
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to a third person to act for him in his absence, as he could not enter Iran at that
time. The document of assignment was completed in the United States and, due
to conditions prevailing during the revolution in 1979, it was not possible for the
assignment to be notarized in Iran. The claimant took the document of
assignment, which was in Farsi, to the Iranian Consul in San Francisco, in whose
presence the claimant signed it. The Consul then stamped and signed the
document. The Iranian government, as respondent, argued that the assignmert
was invalid. Although the assignment did not fulfill the formal requirements of
Iranian law, which stipulated that such an assignment be carried out within Iran,
the Tribunal upheld its validity. The Tribunal found that it would have been
inequitable in the circumstances to deem the assignment invalid. This was
because it had been notarized by an official of the Iranian government. The
Tribunal was further of the view that the Iranian government was responsible for
the circumstances which prevented the claimant from fulfilling the formal
requirements.
This short overview of the attitude of international arbitral tribunals to the
doctrine of estoppel provides evidence for the proposition that such tribunals are
increasingly tending not to rely on any specific national legal order but to apply
general equitable principles-sometimes referred to as "lex mercatoria"--
which are present in most legal systems. This may be seen as a positive
development in terms of the progress of legal principles and a uniform approach
to international contracts. On the other hand it could lead to a divergence
between arbitral awards and national court decisions, thereby increasing the
danger of such awards being annulled by national courts in actions for
enforcement on the basis of narrow interpretation of public policy requliements.
IV. Summary
This study shows that the present state of the law in the Federal Republic of
Germany, England, Canada, the United States, and Australia is unclear concern-
ing the question as to the conditions under which authorities are bound by
promises or assurances they may make.
In none of the four common law countries investigated have the courts arrived
at a clear formula for determining when estoppel may be applied against the
government. A common thread in all four jurisdictions is the fact that the earlier
rigid separation of the two groups of cases, "the statute spel s for itself" and
"the statute defines rights in terms of determination," no longer exists.
It would appear that the Canadian. courts are the most likely to strictly apply
the theory of the two groups of cases and consequently to reject the option of
estoppel whenever it would undermine a statutory rule. In England, on the other
hand, this difference no longer appears to be decisive. The general tendency is
rather to allow estoppel whenever the person affected would otherwise be
seriously disadvantaged. The Australian courts, to the extent that case law exists,
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appear to be following a line similar to that of the English courts, while allowing
a broad interpretation of the tort of negligent misstatement.
It is in the United States that the cases in which the courts will reject estoppel
are the most foreseeable. The majority of the recent decisions of the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals require "affirmative misconduct" alongside the traditional
estoppel criteria. There does, however, still exist quite a degree of uncertainty as
to what this means at the individual level. A tendency seems to be evolving
whereby estoppel will be allowed in cases where the government has acted in its
private or proprietary capacity rather than in its public or sovereign capacity. It
is still unclear, however, whether and/or to what extent this question is influenced
by the issue of public fisc involvement.
The legal position in the Federal Republic of Germany is comparable to that
in Canada. A promise is generally not binding if the authorities acted ultra vires,
or if the promise contravened the law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that
this principle does not apply. An overall comparison of the approach taken by the
Federal Republic of Germany as opposed to the common law countries examined
shows that there exists a high degree of congruence, despite the fact that their
legal orders display quite different pedigrees.
This analysis is thus a further confirmation of the fact that the conditions
prevalent in modem societies, despite historical, geographical, and social
differences, lead their judiciaries and legislatures to analogous means of solving
particular problems. This general observation does not, however, afford a great
deal of comfort to a firm like INVEST in the predicament described at the outset.
It is imperative that firms acquaint themselves with the salient rules and avenues
of redress available to them in the jurisdictions in which they are contemplating
foreign investment.
A comparison of the attitude of international arbitral tribunals to estoppel with
that of the national jurisdictions examined shows that the arbitral tribunals in
general are more willing to apply the doctrine of estoppel (or corresponding
general principles) against governments or their agencies than are national
courts. It would thus certainly be worth serious consideration to include an
arbitration agreement in an investment contract, regardless of the proper law
chosen. It may well be that the chances of success of a firm in the situation of
INVEST, as outlined above, would be enhanced by such a clause.
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